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PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS AND STANDARDS OF
COMPETENCE FOR SELECTING JURORS
CONSTITUTIONAL provisions make trial by jury a fundamental part of the
legal system in every American jurisdiction.' Yet in recent decades intense
criticism has been leveled at jury trial, and many commentators have urged
that it be eliminated entirely. 2 In large part this criticism has been based on
the belief that jurors generally are unable to perform the fact-finding duties
assigned to them. 3 At the root of this inadequacy lies a basically weak struc-
ture for juror selection, the result of poorly defined statutory qualifications and
antiquated selection methods.
Statutory qualifications for jury service vary considerably from one juris-
diction to another and have in common the vice of vagueness. A substantial
number of jurisdictions mention some combination of the following require-
ments: minimum age, citizenship, voting registration, residence within the
jurisdiction, good moral character, absence of criminal record, ability to read,
write, speak or understand the English language, enrollment as a taxpayer,
good health, mental capacity and a fair education. 4 A few statutes define quali-
fications in even more general terms, requiring as criteria that the jurors be
"esteemed in their communities as of good character and sound judgment,"
1. BUscH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 24-26 (1949) ; see James, Trial by Jury
and the New Federal Rites of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022 (1936). For a discussion of
the constitutional guarantees of jury trial see, generally, BUSCH, op. cit. supra, at 16-77.
2. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL CC. 8, 9 (1949) for a criticism of the functioning of
the jury system. See also STALMASTER, WHAT PRICE JURY TRIALS? (1931) ; SUTHERLAND,
A DEBATE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW's DELAY AND THE JURY TRIAL (1929).
Frank and Green both recommend abolition of the jury. FRANK, op. cit. sepra, at 145;
Green, lVhy Trial by Jury?, in SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra, at 162-63. Frank also dis-
cusses suggestions for correcting defects in the jury system. FRANK, op. cit. supra, at 141-
45. In addition to the improvement of jury selection methods, the more constructive recom-
mendations for improving the performance of juries relate to better orientation of jurors
to their tasks, and clearer and more concise court instructions to jurors on the essentials
and alternatives to be considered in arriving at verdicts. See Miner, The Jury Problem,
37J. CRrm. L., C. & P.S. 1 (1946).
3. See OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR 8, 15-16 (1937) ; cf. FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL 118-19 (1949).
4. The various qualifications required by the states are set forth in JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE COMMIrrEE ON SELECTION OF JURORS 33-
35 (1942) ; BUSCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 86-88. Several states, Nebraska, Tennessee and
Virginia, for example, impose by statute a large number of specific qualifications, whereas
other states, notably Massachusetts, Ohio, Delaware, New Hampshire and Maine, list no
more than three. Uniform qualifications for federal jury service are -prescribed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (1952). See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 1059, 1060-61 (1955).
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"sober and intelligent, of good reputation," or "sober, healthy and discreet."5
Many of the statutory qualifications have no direct relevance to adequate jury
performance.6 Those which do seek to insure competence are too vague to in-
dicate either the precise characteristics of competence or the extent to which
a given qualification must be possessed by a competent juror.
Once the legislature has established the qualifications for jury duty, individ-
uals who meet these standards must be found and appointed to the jury panel
through a process of "selection."' 7 Selection procedures and techniques relat-
ing to competence are generally not prescribed by statute. However, require-
ments are established for persons who, under the supervision of the court, are
to serve as jury selectors. They are usually called commissioners and are given
the duty of choosing qualified jurors on the basis of fair geographical repre-
sentation.8 It is a traditiofial practice of jury commissioners to base their
choices upon the solicited advice of members of the community whom they
consider prominent and reputable.9 This usually unverified advice, represent-
ing judgments as to which citizens are qualified for jury duty, is often the sole
basis for selection. Today, in some jurisdictions, eligibility for jury duty is
determined from responses to written questionnaires designed to elicit infor-
mation regarding such qualifications as age, citizenship and years of educa-
tion.'0 When uncertain responses are given, the jury commissioner may re-
5. See Wis. STAT. § 255.01 (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.010 (Vernon 1952); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1235 (Purdon 1930). Federal District Judge Merrill E. Otis sets
out these and other beauteous phrases of many state qualifications statutes as evidence of
high purpose in the selection of jurors. See Otis, Selecting Federal Court Jurors, 14 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 136, 138-39 (1943).
6. These statutory qualifications serve policy purposes largely unrelated to the com-
petent fulfillment of jury duty. For instance, the requirement of local residence is con-
cerned primarily with administrative convenience, while the demand for payment of a poll
tax may serve solely a policy of racial or class exclusion.
7. For a review of current selection techniques and an analysis of each step in the jury
selection process, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, RE0RT OF THE
ComITTEE ON SELECTION OF JURORS 78-89 (1942) ; BuscH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 79-83.
8. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1864-65 (1952); IND. STAT. ANNOT. § 4-3301-04 (Burns
1946) ; VA. CODE § 8-180-84 (1950). Under the Indiana statute, for example, each circuit
court must appoint two persons as jury commissioners for a period of one year. The
appointees must be residents of the place in which terms of court are held, freeholders and
voters of that county, known to be of opposite politics, and characterized by intelligence,
morality and integrity. They must take an oath or affirmation to perform their duties, and
upon failure to perform these duties may be held in contempt of court. In order to guaran-
tee that prospective jurors possess certain qualifications, the commissioners are required
to choose only from among those persons whose names appear on the tax lists. The com-
missioners must then "proceed to select" those qualified for jury duty, and must deposit
their names in a box provided by the court clerk.
9. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON SELECTION OF JURORS 15-18 (1942).
10. Id. at 66. The committee report discusses the use of questionnaires and related
problems, id. at 66-77, and sets forth a sample form of a questionnaire for prospective
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quire a personal interview before making his selection. The interview tech-
nique, regularly used in few jurisdictions, ranges from superficial questioning
and observation to the more intensive and systematic evaluation of juror quali-
fications which is practiced in certain larger New York municipalities." In
some California counties the commissioners employ tests of knowledge and
vocabulary to screen prospective jurors.'2 The most advanced procedures are
used in Los Angeles County where standardized group intelligence examina-
tions and tests of memory and perception are administered. 1 3 These techniques,
though more comprehensive than any others now in use, still are limited to the
assessment of intellectual competence, only one type of juror qualification.
Selections made by the jury commissioner are subject to review by the trial
court. 14 The commissioner is restrained by requirements that he be non-dis-
criminatory 15 and that his selections substantially comply with the vaguely
jurors, id. at 71-73. In a very few jurisdictions the use of a questionnaire is specifically
required by statute. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7912 (1949).
I1. In New York a personal interview by the county clerk is required of prospective
jurors in counties within cities having a population of one million or more. N.Y. JuDIcARY
LAW § 595. See Schechter & Affron, Selecting Persons for Jury Service, 26 CoRNEz L.Q.
677, 682 (1941) ; cf. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
12. Note, Jury Selection in California, 5 STAN. L. REv. 247, 260 (1953). In San Fran-
cisco Count, jurors are given a multiple choice examination containing twenty-five common
legal terms. A representative question asks whether larceny means escape, tension, theft
or market. Id. at 260 & n.83. San Diego County uses an oral true-false test to measure a
prospective juror's response to legal situations. The juror must answer true or false to the
following type of question: "In civil actions between individual persons and corporations,
jurors should give greater consideration to the rights of individual persons than to those
of corporations." Id. at 260 n.82.
Despite the augmentation of these juror assessment techniques by questionnaires and
interviews, they still fall short of a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of the corn-
pie: of qualifications necessary for jury duty. See text at p. 534 infra.
13. Letter from James H. Chadbourn, Professor of Law, University of California,
Los Angeles, to the Yale Law Journal, Feb. 25, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. See
also Martineau, The Los Angeles Plan of Juror Selection, 15 L.A. BAR BULL. 55, 58
(1939).
14. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935
(1954) ; Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40, 48 (Ky. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
"99 (1954) ; Ritz v. Kingdon, 79 S.E.2d 123, 125 (W. Va. 1953) ; Good v. Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 596, 599, 62 N.W.2d 425, 427 (1954).
15. The jury commissioner's selections must "comport with the concept of the jury as
a cross-section of the community." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). The
deliberate and systematic exclusion by the jury commissioner of any class of people on the
basis of social or economic distinctions has been held a denial of due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, due process
under the Fifth Amendment, and the right to a "fair trial" granted by the Sixth Amendment.
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (exclusion of women) ; Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Ry., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (exclusion of daily wage earners) ; Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (exclusion of Negroes) ; Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452 (E.D.
Ky. 1905), rev'd on other grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906) (exclusion on basis of political
affiliation) ; Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) ; accord, Searle v.
Roman Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909) (exclusion on basis of religion).
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defined statutory qualifications.' 6 It is the voir dire examination, however.
that ultimately determines the acceptability of his nominations.17 As a practical
matter the examination seeks primarily to discover the existence of bias. l1,ut
the jury commissioner's selections may also be rejected in the voir dire because
of other objections to competence based upon prior investigation by the parties'
attorneys or upon fortuitous revelations of lack of qualification.' 8
Clearly, present qualification statutes and selection procedures provide nn
assurance of adequate jurors. Prerequisite to the improvement of jury per-
formance is the adoption of a minimum standard of juror competence and the
employment of precise and objective selection devices, notably the psychological
test, to assess the qualifications of prospective jurors.
In order to merit selection the juror should possess a stated degree of the
following combination of traits: (1) physical integrity-adequate vision, hear-
ing and stamina; (2) fund of general information-sufficient for an elementary
understanding of things and events; (3) critical thinking ability-the use of
logic in evaluating argument, making inferences and arriving at conclusions:
(4) fund of information about legal institutions-no marked ignorance and
misinformation about commonly known legal processes and personnel; (5)
personal stability-freedom from severe mental illness, marked emotional in-
stability and morbid pre-occupations; (6) critical behavior judgment-freedom
from marked naivete in judging behavior; (7) fair and reasonable attitudes-
a willingness to weigh honestly and carefully all the evidence. Each of these
categories is definite enough to be accurately measured and can therefore serve
as a guide in an improved process of jury selection.
Objective psychological tests can determine the existence of these qualifica-
tions better than any techniques of selection now in use. 19 They provide a
16. Harrison v. State, 231 Ind. 147, 165, 106 N.E.2d 912, 921 (1952) ; Walter v. State,
208 Ind. 231, 236, 195 N.E. 268, 270 (1935) ; People v. Johnson, 2 Ill. 2d 165, 168, 117 N.E.
2d 91, 94 (1954) (dictum).
17. The purpose of the voir dire examination is to permit further inquiry into the
qualifications and attitudes of the prospective jurors prior to their being impaneled and
sworn to try a case. See BuscH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 113-31; KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS
AND METHODS 243-52 (1954). The scope and conduct of the examination are matters
usually left to the discretion of the court. Tarrance v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40, 48
(Ky. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 899 (1954) ; Putnam v. Pacific Monthly Co., 68 Ore.
36, 53, 130 Pac. 986, 992 (1913) ; Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 526, 100 A.2d
467, 471 (1953) ; Parker v. Hoefer, 118 Vt. 1, 5, 100 A.2d 434, 438 (1953). Customarily,
opposing counsel question prospective jurors on matters relating to their competence and
bias, but the court in its discretion may take over the questioning of jurors and conduct
the entire examination itself. United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa.
1953) ; FED. R. CRuM. P. 24(a).
18. On the problem of selecting a jury from the point of view of adversary partics,
see, GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 152-201 (1935), LAKE, HOW TO WIN LAWSUITS
BEFORE JURIES 16-29 (1954) ; Arado, Selecting a Jury, 35 CHI. B. REc. 54 (1953). See
also Os B RN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR C. 8 (1937).
19. Objective tests give a succinct evaluation of particular traits of behavior, which
for the purpose of study are abstracted from the total complex of behavior operations. Such
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yardstick for measuring the competence of the prospective juror and thus en-
able the commissioner to set a specific standard as a prerequisite to nomina-
tion.2 ° This standard should be based on the minimum level achieved by a
large percentage of comparable individuals who have taken the test and estab-
lished the range of scores.21 Utilization of psychological tests will largely elimi-
nate subjectivity and uncertainty in the commissioner's selection procedures. 22
tests provide estimates of these traits more quickly, more briefly and more accurately than
do the subjective judgments and personal estimates which are characteristic of present
selection techniques.
"Objective" psychological tests are to be distinguished from "projective" psychological
techniques. Projective techniques make an infinitely more complex and more comprehen-
sive assessment of an individual's personality and behavior. They are, however, heavily
dependent for their success on the skill and judgment of the examiner. Though potentially
more informative, projective techniques are probably not feasible at the present time for
use in the process of screening large numbers of prospective jurors. See FREEMAN, THEORY
AND PRACrICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING CC. 19, 20 (1955). For a brief exposition on
objective psychological tests, written for lawyers, see Hunt, The Uses and Abuses of
Psychometric Tests, 35 Ky. L.J. 38 (1946).
20. Objective tests undergo a process known as standardization. A single test is ad-
ministered to large groups of individuals and the scores of these individuals, who may num-
ber in the hundreds or thousands, are accumulated. The range of scores provides a com-
parative scale against which may be placed the scores of persons who subsequently take the
test and who are comparable in general characteristics to the sample population. The place
where a particular person's score falls along the range of scores is most often called a
percentile. It is that point which represents the percentage of sample scores exceeded by
the person taking the test. See ADKINS, CONSTRucrION AND ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVEMENT
TESTS 144 (1947) ; FREEMAN, op. cit. supra -note 19, c. 2.
21. The problem of deciding upon a critical score or level of competence below which
persons will be considered unqualified for jury duty can be resolved systematically through
the use of statistical criteria. Those concerned with establishing a fixed minimum passing
score may base their estimate on the extent to which a given score falls outside the range
of scores which most people are likely to achieve. Statistical methods establish numerous
procedures and criteria for determining that point. Such statistical techniques as "the
middle 80 per cent range," "the standard deviation" and "the semi-interquartile range"
provide for a systematic determination of those scores, and hence those individuals who fall
at the extremes-notably here the lower extreme-in any distribution of scores. For an
elaboration and fuller explanation of the statistical process, see GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL
STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION cc. 3-6 (1942) ; WALKER, ELEMENTARY STATIS-
TICAL METHODS cC. 3, 5, 8 (1943). The setting of a critical test score can also be accom-
plished roughly and more arbitrarily by the jury commissioner. He can decide, for example,
that the lowest twenty scores in one hundred, or the lowest ten or five, will fail to qualify.
This enables the commissioner to vary the qualification level in relation to the need and
availability of jurors, but such arbitrary choice may not lend assurance that the critical
level set corresponds to that which will, on a better considered and statistically more accur-
ate basis, separate qualified from unqualified persons.
22. Commonly, a subjective judgment as to the existence of a particular trait in an-
other individual is a crude guess. Persons making such judgments do not systematically
use objective criteria or a standardized scale for assessment. In contrast, objective psy-
chological tests undergo research procedures the essential characteristics of which are
objectivity and certainty. Scores achieved on a test which measures a particular trait are
compared to manifestations of that trait which have been evident in the previous behavior
1956]
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Proof of their unique value in the assessment of intelligence and personality
qualifications is provided by the reliance placed upon them for the screening of
personnel in the armed forces, in business and industry, and in medical and
educational institutions.
23
Many presently used and carefully developed objective tests of intelligence
and personality are suitable for use in this field.2 4 and others can be designed
which are specifically adapted to the purpose of jury selection. These tests may
be employed either in batteries to measure a wide range of qualifications or
individually to assess a single trait.25 The better known tests have undergone
extensive experimental evaluations. They are carefully and elaborately ex-
amined to determine whether they accurately measure what their creators claim
they measure, and whether they do so consistently.2 6 Stringent professional
of the individual taking the test, or to the results of other tests measuring the same per-
sonality factors. Upon completion of this try-out process the test will provide a criterion
of the existence of the trait independent of the judgment of both the test constructor and
the examiner. See note 20 supra.
23. Objective psychological tests were widely used initially in the first World War.
See FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 241; PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINING IN THE UNITED
STATES (Yerkes ed. 1921). Subsequently, they have been adopted in a variety of enter-
prises. Many businesses and industries depend heavily on them in the screening of job appli-
cants for personality stability and capability, and the tests are also used to assess interest
level and potential suitability for particular positions. See H. MOORE, PSYCHOLOGY FOIR
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY cc. 5-8 (2d ed. 1942). They are widely used by schools to
measure intelligence, vocational aptitudes and entrance qualifications. See EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT pt. 1 (Lindquist ed. 1951); GREENE, MEASUREMENT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
pt. 2 (1941) ; CRAWFORD & BURNHAM, FORECASTING COLLEGE ACHIEVEMENT pt. 1 (1946).
Psychiatry and medicine have adopted the tests for use as diagnostic aids and in the evalu-
ation of treatment progress and recovery. See 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD MEDICAL PSY-
CHOLOGY pt. 4 (Weider ed. 1953). In World War II every soldier was required to take an
objective test of general ability upon entrance into service, and some branches relied heavily
on specially developed objective tests to evaluate the existence of particularly desired
abilities. See PRINTED CLASSIFICATION TESTS (Rep. No. 5, U.S. Gov't Printing Office,
Guilford ed. 1947); U.S. AMY AIR FORCES, AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY PROGRAM RESEARCH
REPORTS 1-19 (1947-48) ; O.S.S. STAFF, ASSESSMENT OF MEN (1948). Objective tests are
used as an instrument of selection in many branches of the federal government today. See
MOSHER & KINGSLEY, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION c. 9, particularly at 182 (4th
ed. 1941); H. MoORE, op. cit. supra, at 106. YODER, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS 194-95 & n.16 (1943).
24. A brief description and assessment of nearly all psychological tests which have
been developed is contained in THE FOURTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEABooK (Buros
ed. 1953). This compendium lists for each test its purpose, time and method of adminis-
tration, and a critical evaluation of it by psychologists. For each test there is also a listing
of literature reporting the use and value of the test in the different situations where it has
been applied, and a catalogue of published reports discussing limitations, modifications and
suggested improvements of the test.
25. For a discussion of examination administrative procedures and consideration of
the merits of the use of tests singly and in groups, see THOENDIKE, PERSONNEL SELECTION:
TEST AND MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES (1949).
26. Objective psychological tests attain the highest percentage of accuracy in their
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standards of statistical precision must be met 27 before any test is commercially
marketed by the better known suppliers of psychological tests.2 8
Objective tests are also administratively feasible for the screening of jurors.
A single test is usually brief, varying in time limit from ten minutes to an hour.
The tests are easily administered, requiring true-or-false, yes-or-no, or single
word answers which can be scored quickly. They can be given to large groups
simultaneously and at a cost ranging from one to ten cents per person. With
only a simple orientation as to procedure, the jury commissioner, court clerk
or assistants can conduct the testing program.2 9 And the judge and jury com-
missioner, relying upon competent psychological counsel, can make the choice
of tests to be used. 30
Should a jury commissioner decide to adopt the suggested qualifications
and psychological test procedures, existing statutory or court requirements
would ordinarily present no obstacle. Often the qualifications can be interpreted
to lie within the purview of present, broadly defined legislative mandates, so
that new legislation is unnecessary. 31 If statutory change is unavoidable, en-
assessments of large numbers of subjects. The results achieved on these tests will be cor-
rect for most individuals, but will, theoretically, be in error in assessing a small percentage
of persons. Tests are not perfect estimates of any given attribute, but they are considerably
more specific and more precise than common subjective judgments in the evaluation of
selected personal characteristics. Caution must be exercised to interpret the results of tests
only within the limits of what they purport to measure, with full recognition that there is
likely to be a small percentage of error in the evaluation of any large group of persons.
27. A joint committee of the American Psychological Association, the American Edu-
cational Research Association and the National Council on Ieasurements Used in Edu-
cation has established specific standards for test construction and test publication. See
TrcHICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS AND DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUIENTS
(1954), printed as a supplement to 51 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. No. 2, pt. II (1954).
28. The Psychological Corporation, 522 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y., for example,
requires that the members of its board of directors and officers be members of the American
Psychological Association. (Membership in this national organization requires a minimum
of a master's degree in psychology from a recognized college or university, and creditable
experience in the profession of psychology varying according to the level of membership
sought, but no less than one year.) The corporation abides by and fosters the scientific and
professional recommendations set forth by that association. See THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COR-
POrATioN, 1955 CATALOG OF THE TEST DIvisioN inside back cover.
29. Each objective psychological test is normally distributed with a handbook or manual
of instructions for guidance in the use of the test. Requirements and cautions for its ad-
ministration are specifically set out, the technique of scoring is explained, and data and
standards are given to aid in correctly assessing the significance of the results.
30. Psychological test corporations generally provide a consultation service to advise
organizations who may have use for psychological tests. The psychology departments of
large universities are able to provide expert counsel in the selection and use of tests.
Firms of consulting psychologists are also available to give advice on the choice and use
of tests or to handle the entire process of test selection, administration, scoring and inter-
pretation. See, e.g., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CORPORATION, 1955 CATALOG OF THE TEST
DIVISION inside front cover.
31. The canons of statutory construction authorize the interpretation of ambiguous or
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actment of the entire set of qualifications would provide a concise and compre-
hensive minimum standard for competent jurors.32 It is clear that use of psy-
chological tests to implement existing standards requires no new legislation.
Such improved methods of selection can be put into practice by a rule of court
or by the commissioner in the exercise of the discretion now granted him by
statute.
33
Three legal arguments are likely to be urged against adoption of the pro-
posed program. Most noteworthy is the probable assertion that a dispropor-
tionate number of prospective jurors from certain races or social and economic
groups will be disqualified as a result of the application of minimum standards
of qualifications and psychological tests for their evaluation. This dispropor-
tionality would be denounced as a violation of the constitutional requirement
announced in Glasser v. United States, that juries must be selected so as to
"comport with the concept of... a cross-section of the community." 3' How-
generally worded jury qualifications statutes in a manner that will best effectuate the legis-
lative aim of securing qualified jurors. Therefore, the employment by the commissioner
of more precise standards and better methods for their assessment should be construed as a
valid effort to comply with presently existing statutory requirements. See 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4503 (3d ed., Horack 1943) (ambiguous
statutes) ; 3 id. §§ 5501-06 (liberal or strict construction).
In California, for example, the juror qualifications statute requires that only those per-
sons can serve "who are in the possession of the natural faculties, and not infirm or decrepit,
of fair character and approved integrity, and of sound judgment." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 205 (1953). And the statute governing juror selection requires that the jury commis-
sioner "diligently ...inquire and inform himself in respect to the qualifications" of pro-
spective jurors. Id. § 204c. Specific requirements of knowledge, vocabulary and intelligence
have been subsumed under the qualifications statute, and the possession of these traits has
been measured by means of objective examinations without any known legal objection. See
notes 12, 13 supra and accompanying text; note 33 infra.
32. See text at p. 534 supra.
33. People v. Hess, 104 Cal. App. 2d 642, 669, 234 P.2d 65, 83 (1951). In this case,
the jury commissioner notified 35,000 prospective jurors to report for examination. After
completion of a personal data sheet and personal interview by the jury commissioner or by
a judicial secretary, 3,500 were selected for jury duty. The court upheld the jury com-
missioner in this designation of only about ten per cent of the available individuals. Cf.
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 270-72 (1947) ; text following note 7 supra.
34. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). In this case defendant contended
that he was denied an impartial trial because of systematic exclusion from the jury panel
of all women who were not members of the Illinois League of Women Voters. The Court
upheld the contention that this procedure, if proved, would be a denial of the right of jury
trial.
The "cross-section" idea stated in Glasser has been asserted to be fundamental to the
constitutional right of jury trial. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946) ;
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Ry., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ; cf. note 15 supra. A "cross-section"
of the community would appear to have reference to the proportional representation of in-
dividuals from all classes and groups in the community. However, the rule has been inter-
preted to forbid only exclusions made systematically and intentionally, not to require that
all "classes" or "groups" must in fact be represented on each jury array. Fay v. New York,
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ever, since Glasser a majority of the Court has approved the setting of high
qualification standards and the use of systematic questioning to assess intelli-
gence and literacy, even though these procedures resulted in the disqualification
of a disproportionate number of a particular group.3 5 Thus, it appears that the
cross-section rule is not a limitation on the establishment of a suitable level of
juror qualifications unless the requirements are designed to secure arbitrary
or discriminatory aims.30 Although a four justice minority took the position
that the tests and standards were subjective and discriminatory, and resulted
in the selection of a jury which failed to satisfy the cross-section rule,3 7 even
this minority agreed that a minimum standard could be established for all
prospective jurors.38 Furthermore, neither the majority nor the minority
opposed the use of objective test methods to assess whether jurors are adequate-
ly qualified.
It may also be asserted that jury qualifications and selection procedures,
as an integral part of the right to trial by jury, were permanently fixed at the
time that right was adopted into the constitution.3 9 This argument is based on
the unanimous judicial opinion that the guarantee of trial by jury preserves
intact the common law right and forbids alteration except by constitutional
332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947) ; Thiel v. Southern Pac. Ry., supra at 220; United States v.
Local 36, International Fishermen, 70 F. Supp. 782, 795-97 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
35. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 291 (1947), upheld the so-called special or "blue
ribbon" jury. The defendants had objected that persons fully qualified for general jury
duty had been discriminatorily eliminated from the blue ribbon panel. They alleged that
the qualifications and selection techniques failed to give proportionate representation to
laborers, Negroes and women-in fact no laborers had been nominated for the panel. The
Court refused to accept this contention and affirmed their conviction as having been made
by a lawfully constituted jury. On the Fay case and the problem of blue ribbon juries, see
Notes, 60 HARV. L. REv. 613, 21 So. CALIF. L. REV. 102 (1947).
36. "The rule is that a violation of the [Fourteenth Amendment due process] clause
occurs if in the jury there is a systematic or arbitrary exclusion of, or a discrimination be-
tween, persons of a particular race." Wong Yim v. United States, 118 F.2d 667, 669 (9th
Cir. 1941). See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ; Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316,
319-21 (1906) ; cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (commissioner may
use discretion to obtain competent jurors). See also notes 15, 34 supra.
37. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261., 298-99 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Justices
Murphy, Black, Douglas and Rutledge).
38. Justice Murphy, who wrote the dissenting opinion in the Fay case, stated that the
jury "is a democratic institution, representative of all qualified classes of people." Id. at
300. (Emphasis added.) In Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 569 (1948), another opinion
upholding the New York blue ribbon jury system, the Fay dissenters agreed that certain
persons below a minimum level of competence were not qualified to serve on juries, and
indicated their approval, as consistent with the "cross-section" rule, of the adoption of
measures calculated to weed out these persons. Justice Murphy, speaking for the dissenters,
declared: "it is from that welter of qualified individuals, who meet specified miimum
standards, that juries are to be chosen." Moore v. New York, supra, at 570. (Emphasis
added.)
39. See notes 41-42 infra and accompanying text.
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amendment.40 However, the courts have universally held that, since qualifica-
tions and selection methods had always been legislatively determined and there-
fore were not crystallized as a part of the common law, these features of the
jury system continue to be subject to modification by statute.4 ' In short, the
constitution guarantees a fundamental mode of trial but does not determine
procedural details.42
Psychological testing may be opposed as an unlawful delegation of the com-
missioner's statutory responsibility for the selection of jurors.43 It can be argued
that the judgments and criteria used in the development of tests are those of
other persons, and that these, in effect, become substitutes for the jury com-
missioner's own judgment and choice of jurors. Opponents may also claim that
because persons other than the commissioner administer and score the tests,
it is these individuals who are making the determinations of qualification. The
commissioner is charged by statute with the duty of selecting qualified jurors,44
and courts have held that he violates the law if he does not himself decide which
jurors will be chosen.45 It may be said in rebuttal that the jury commissioner
40. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) ; Pomeroy v. Collins, 198 Cal.
46, 70, 243 Pac. 657, 667 (1926) ; Booth v. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 413, 419, 94 P.2d 846, 849
(1939) ; Spurgeon v. Worley, 169 Tenn. 697, 701, 90 S.W.2d 948, 949 (1936). The con-
stitutional right to a jury trial may be asserted to mean that the identical kind of common
law jury trial is preserved. So interpreted, trial by jury would mean trial by jurors having
the same qualifications and selected in the same manner as at common law at the time the
constitutional provision was adopted. Cf. BuscH, LAw AND TACTICS IN JuRY TRIALS 27-
60 (1949) ; CLAI K, CODE PLEADING 91-92 (2d ed. 1947).
41. Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 114 AtI. 825 (1921) ; Dixon v. State, 167
So. 340, 348 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 167 So. 349 (Ala. 1936) ; People ex rel. Denny
v. Traeger, 372 Ill. 11, 14, 22 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1939).
42. In Dixon v. State, supra note 41, at 348, the court stated:
"It is the universal and unvarying rule of all common-law jurisdictions that legis-
lative regulations touching the manner in which jurors shall be selected, or the
mode of procuring and impaneling a jury, do not infringe a constitutional provision
that the right of jury trial shall remain inviolate so long as the essential elements of
number, impartiality, and unanimity are preserved."
43. It is sometimes said that a delegated power may not be further delegated by the
person to whom such power is given by the legislature. 42 Ax. JUR., Public Admziistratire
Law § 73 (1942). However, the rule does not preclude the use of subordinates who are
directed by the officer with the delegated power to investigate and report the facts and give
recommendations. See People v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., 165 N.Y. 362, 364-65,
59 N.E. 138, 139 (1901) (statutory requirement that commissioners may recommend rc-
pairs upon railroads "after a careful personal examination" does not prevent the utilization
of and reliance upon expert inspectors to make examinations for them) ; GELLHORN, AD-
mINIsTRATivE LAw 315-23 (1st ed. 1940). A distinction is made between a delegation of
power to another and the use of others as assistants in the discharge of the delegated duty.
See notes 45-46 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 8 supra.
45. Chance v. State, 115 Fla. 379, 381, 155 So. 663, 664 (1934); Dow v. Carnegie-
Illinois Steel Co., 100 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (dictum) ; cf. State v. Tate,
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does exercise the full power and control contemplated by the legislature, 46 since
the weight which he gives to the psychological test results is entirely within
his discretion. Furthermore, the custom of utilizing outside judgments has
long been a jury selection procedure and the tests are no more than a neces-
sary modern replacement for the accepted practice of depending on reputable
members of the community for opinions as to who would make competent
jurors.4 7
Strengthened jury selection processes have broad implications for the im-
proved operation of the jury system and the effectiveness of law in society.
Less of the court's time may be spent in the voir dire examination of com-
petence and jury calendar congestion partially eliminated when jurors are
initially selected with greater care. A more competent jury may force a change
in the tactics of advocacy, so that attorneys will put greater emphasis on rational
rather than emotional appeals. Parties may also be dissuaded from taking
weak cases to court in the hope of achieving an unjustified result. Exclusionary
rules of evidence, evolved to protect litigants from inept juries,48 can be liberal-
ized. juries held in higher esteem will restore respect for the right of trial
by jury, and even, perhaps, for jury duty. The discoveries and techniques of
psychology should be pressed into the service of the judicial system, for they
185 La. 1006, 1022, 171 So. 108, 113 (1936). In the Chance case, under a statute requiring
the county commissioners to "personally select and make out a list" of the names of quali-
fied jurors, the commissioners allowed other persons to assist in the selection of the names
from the registration books. The court held this practice a violation of the specific statutory
requirement of personal selection by the commissioners, but implied that the use of neces-
sary clerical assistants in the selection process would not constitute a violation. Chance v.
State, supra at 380, 155 So. at 665.
46. See Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644
(1937). In this case, the court clerk, who along with the jury commissioner was authorized
to select jurors, solicited the names of qualified jurors by means of a letter asking such
information from persons in the community who were considered reliable. The argument
was made that this was an unlawful delegation of the duties of selecting jurors imposed
on the court clerk and jury commissioner by statute. The court said: "The method of
selection employed was not a delegation, but a discharge of duty. The clerk and jury com-
missioner did not authorize nor empower any one to act for them, and we apprehend the
law does not contemplate that they must acquire personal knowledge of or acquaintance
with prospective jurors so that they may act on their personal knowledge. The manner of
acquiring information is for them to determine." Id., 93 F.2d at 391.
47. See notes 9, 46 supra and accompanying text. Clearly, the maintenance of the older
selection system is not feasible in areas of large population where anonymity and a lack of
familiarity with neighbors and persons living in the community are common. Nor is it
feasible where there is a substantial amount of family mobility and change in community
membership over relatively short periods of time, nor in "commuter" communities where
the average individual spends a relatively brief period of time in the community of his
residence.
48, See FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 123 (1949) ; GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 400 (1930);
OsEoRN, TiE MIND OF THE JUROR 53 (1937); WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF
960 (2d ed. 1931).
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offer an unprecedented opportunity to promote the efficient administration of
justice.49
49. In this note, juror qualifications and selection have been discussed without direct
reference to the question of jury function. The minimum qualifications suggested herein,
see text at p. 534 supra, are deemed essential regardless of one's concept of jury purpose
and function. A critical minimum of competence is necessary for any rationally-based
decision-making process. For a presentation and discussion of theories relating to jury
function, see Broeder, Finctions of the Jury: Fact or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 386
(1954); FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 110-11 (1949).
